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Abstract
To enable the verification of authentication protocols, Schneider formulated the rank function
approach which could be used, under suitable circumstances, to verify protocols modelled using the
process algebra CSP. We develop this theoretical result and extend it to a practical framework which
can be used to model and analyse a wider variety of security protocols with respect to a wider range
of security specifications than were hitherto possible. These results are achieved using PVS, which
also provides tool support for the rank function approach.
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1. A (formal) introduction
It was realised at an early stage in the history of security protocols that they were suscepti-
ble to extremely subtle flaws, and that formal techniques were needed to investigate their
properties. The need for formal techniques is even greater today due to the increased liabili-
ties. Perhaps the most widely publicised success of formal methods in the security domain is
Lowe’s attack on the Needham–Schroeder public key protocol [11], and this has been used as
a benchmark for other analysis techniques ever since. Such ingenuity started a ‘gold rush’ in
the search for other attacks. As a consequence, techniques for verifying protocol correctness
have been, until recently, overshadowed by attack-motivated techniques.
As the subject matures it is reasonable to expect an increased interest in methods that
are capable of verifying protocol correctness. Methods such as the rank function approach
of [18] have already proven to be successful in the quest for protocol correctness. This
approach, in the context of the modelling language Communicating Sequential Processes
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(CSP) [9,17,19], is our starting point. The principal contribution of this paper is to extend
the approach’s versatility by developing its underlying theory, and improve the scalability
of the approach by using the Prototype Verification System (PVS) theorem prover [13] as
a formal, interactive environment in which proofs are constructed.
Section 2 gives an overview of the common features of security protocols together with
their aims. This is followed by a definition of the relevant parts of the CSP language. We then
consider the rank function approach, as presented in [18], and its implementation in PVS [3].
In Section 3, we develop a new suite of rewrite rules and PVS strategies for the rank function
approach. These rules are polymorphic with respect to CSP events and are, therefore, inde-
pendent of any specific network architecture. As such, it is possible to construct a variety of
rank theorems for specific security properties and specific network architectures without the
need to alter the PVS embedding. This is demonstrated by using the rules to derive the rank
theorem defined in [18]. Sections 4 and 5 investigate the applicability of the results of Section
3 to two new areas: Section 4 develops a rank theorem for the analysis of non-repudiation of
origin properties, and Section 5 develops a rank theorem for the introduction of a notion of
time. A small example of a rank analysis is included in Section 5.
2. Background
A security protocol consists of a series of communications between two or more agents
on a network whose aim is to achieve one or more security goals. Protocols can be classified
according to their cryptographic mechanisms (e.g. shared key or public key protocols), the
nature of the agents involved (e.g. whether a trusted third party or server is needed), the
number of communications required (e.g. one-pass or two-pass protocols), or the kinds of
properties that the protocols are intended to fulfil (e.g. one-way or mutual authentication).
The characteristics of a protocol are determined by the contents of the messages that
are exchanged during a run of the protocol. Such messages will typically include identity
information (the names of the agents involved in the run), freshness identifiers (indicat-
ing how old the messages are), labels to uniquely identify the run of the protocol, and
short-term session keys. Of course, some of these message components will occur in an
encrypted form.
2.1. CSP
The environment in which security protocols are run is complex. A typical network
consists of a large number of components each of which can act independently or interact
with other components. The complexity of the system arises from the nature of the possible
interactions. Fortunately, from a formal methods point of view, we can abstract away many
of the physical aspects of the system to perform analyses at a higher, more conceptual level.
However, we must be careful not to abstract too much and risk overlooking potentially
hazardous interactions (i.e. breaches of security). CSP combines a conceptual clarity with a
solid semantic foundation; it is within this framework that we investigate security protocols
formally.
2.1.1. Notation
The language of CSP is used to define processes. A CSP process is a formal object
or entity which exists in isolation or interacts with its environment by performing atomic
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actions called events. The classic example is the vending machine [9]: we can model a
vending machine as a CSP process and model its visible (external) behaviour as a set of
events. The event coin could represent the machine accepting money from its environment,
and the event choc could represent the machine dispensing a bar of chocolate.
The interface (or alphabet) of a process P , denoted by σ(P ), is the set of events that P
may engage in. In the early versions of CSP, the alphabet of a process was given explicitly.
Modern practice leaves the alphabet of a process implicit (i.e. within the process definition
itself).
Stop
The simplest CSP process is Stop—its behaviour is to do nothing.
Event prefixing
If P is a process and a is an event then a → P is a process that can perform the event a
and then behave as P . For example, the process
coin → (choc → Stop)
corresponds to a vending machine which accepts a coin, dispenses a chocolate bar and then
ceases its operation. Note the causal dependence of the event choc on the event coin.
A notion of input and output can be introduced if we consider structured events of the
form c.v, where c is the name of a channel and v is the value of a message passing along
the channel. Each channel has a type which corresponds to the possible values that can
pass along it. We can now define two new kinds of prefixing: the process c!v → P outputs
the value v on channel c and then behaves as P , and the process c?x : V → Px is prepared
to input any value x of type V and then behave as the process Px .
External choice
If P and Q are processes then PQ is the process that can behave either as P or as
Q (the selection is dictated by its environment). In addition to binary choice, there is an
indexed choice operator. If I is an indexing set then i∈I Pi is a process that behaves as
one of the indexed processes Pi .
Parallel composition
If P and Q are processes and A is a set of events then P |[A ]|Q is a process that
behaves as P and Q running in parallel, with the proviso that they must synchronise on
the events in A (i.e. for a ∈ A to occur, both P and Q must participate in its occurrence).
There is an indexed parallel composition operator in which all indexed processes Pi must
synchronise on the events in A. This is written as |[A ]| i∈IPi .
A special case of parallel composition is when A = ∅. The process P |[ ∅ ]|Q behaves
as P andQ running independently of each other. This is called the interleaving of P andQ.
Binary interleaving is written in CSP as P ||| Q, and the indexed interleaving of processes
Pi is written |||i∈I Pi .
Recursion
It is also possible to define recursive processes in CSP. For example, by assigning a
name VM to the following process:
VM = coin → (choc → VM)
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and by allowing the process to call VM itself, we can represent a vending machine with
infinite capacity. Alternatively, we can write this as:
µX.coin → (choc → X)
where the operator µ denotes the ‘least’ solution to the equation:
X = coin → (choc → X)
2.1.2. Traces
The events of a CSP process correspond to the visible behaviour of the process. At
this level of abstraction, it seems natural to equate two CSP processes when they exhibit
the same visible behaviour; that is, when they perform the same sequences of events. In
general, this notion of equality is not discriminating enough to capture all forms of behav-
iour—for example, it does not recognise deadlock or non-determinism. However, for the
kinds of properties that concern us, it will be sufficient. We shall therefore use a suitable
semantic model for CSP processes—the so-called traces model [9].
A trace of a process is a finite list of events that can be performed by the process in
the order prescribed by the list. A trace is represented by a sequence of events surrounded
by angled brackets (〈〉 denotes the empty trace). For example, 〈〉, 〈coin〉, 〈coin, choc〉
and 〈coin, choc, coin〉 are traces of the process VM defined above. The concatenation
of two traces t1 and t2 is written t1  t2. If A is a set of events then tA is the maximal
subsequence of t all of whose events are in A. We can define a prefix relation  between
traces as follows:
t1  t2 iff ∃t.t2 = t1  t
For example, 〈coin, choc〉  〈coin, choc, coin〉.
In the traces model, a CSP process P is denoted by the set of all traces that can be
performed by the process; this is written as traces(P ). The set of traces of any process P
meets two fundamental properties:
• 〈〉 ∈ traces(P )
• t1  t2 ∧ t2 ∈ traces(P ) ⇒ t1 ∈ traces(P )
The first property states that all processes can be observed to do nothing. The second
property states that the set of traces is prefix-closed—it must be possible to observe a prefix
of any observable trace.
Equality in the traces model can be used to define a notion of equality for processes. For
process P and Q, we define:
P =T Q iff traces(P ) = traces(Q)
One consequence of the definition of traces is
c?x : V → Px =T x∈V c.x → Px
Therefore, input prefixing can be viewed as syntactic sugar and, as such, it is not imple-
mented in the PVS embedding described in Section 2.4.
2.1.3. Trace specifications
As well as trace equality, we are also interested in other properties of traces. A trace
specification is defined to be any predicate on traces, and we say that a process P satisfies
a trace specification S if, and only if, all its traces satisfy the predicate. Formally:
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P sat S iff ∀tr ∈ traces(P ).S(tr)
This kind of specification is called a safety specification. For example, if length(tr)
denotes the length of the trace tr then:
VM sat λtr.length(tr{choc})  length(tr{coin})
i.e. the number of bars of chocolate dispensed is always less than, or equal to, the number
of coins deposited.
2.1.4. Event based authentication
Security properties can be formalised as trace specifications so that any violation in
the specification corresponds to a breach of the security property. We begin by assuming
that each event has a message component containing a piece of information. For secrecy,
we aim to prove that a message m is not learnt by an eavesdropper. This is modelled in
CSP by defining an eavesdropper that is willing to perform an event, say leak.m′, for every
message m′ that he knows. (We are not concerned with the modelling of the eavesdropper’s
knowledge at this stage.) If NET is the process that combines the communicating agents,
the eavesdropper and any other components of the communications network, then we say
that m is secret if:
NET sat λtr.tr{leak.m} = 〈〉
i.e. the event leak.m is not in any trace of NET .
We interpret authentication as a causal dependence between sets of events: an event set
T authenticates another event set R if, for all traces, the occurrence of an event in T is
preceded by an event in R. More formally, we define:
T authenticates R iff λtr.tr  R = 〈〉 ⇒ tr  T = 〈〉1
This definition of authentication corresponds to weak agreement in [12].
It is possible to define secrecy as an instance of authentication: if T = {leak.m} and
R = ∅ then:
T authenticates R=λtr.true ⇒ tr  {leak.m} = 〈〉
=λtr.tr  {leak.m} = 〈〉
Thus, we shall concentrate on properties of the form T authenticates R.2
2.2. A proof strategy for authentication
In order to prove properties of the form T authenticates R, [18] proposes a novel
approach based on message invariants. This approach was developed with a specific net-
work architecture in mind: a CSP representation of the Dolev–Yao model [2] in which
an interleaved set of agent processes communicate via a medium that is under the control
of a (potentially) malicious process. This process, which we shall call ENEMY , has the
potential to block, re-direct, duplicate or fake messages on the medium. However, when
co-operating with the agents, it accepts a message on an agent’s transmitting channel and
1 The correctness of this definition is a consequence of the prefix-closure condition for the traces of a process.
2 This trace predicate is termed R precedes T in [8,7].
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passes the message on the intended agent’s receiving channel: the event trans.i.j.m is
interpreted as agent i attempting to send message m to agent j , and rec.i.j.m corresponds
to agent i receiving message m (apparently) from agent j . Malicious behaviour is achieved
by parameterising ENEMY with a set of messages S that can be used to construct ‘fake’
messages (i.e. messages that have not originated from an agent). Such a message can be
used to deceive any agent that is willing to receive it. All messages sent by the agents are
added to S since they are visible to the enemy process (although encrypted parts may be
unreadable), and any message m that reaches an agent is constructed from S via a generates
relation . The construction of m from S is written S  m.
ENEMY(S)=(trans?i?j?m → ENEMY(S ∪ {m}))
 (i,j,m|Smrec!i!j !m → ENEMY(S))
The entire network architecture is then defined as:
NET = (|||i∈U USERi) |[ trans, rec ]|ENEMY(INIT )
where USERi is the process describing the behaviour of agent i, and INIT is the enemy’s
initial knowledge set. This architecture with three agents (i.e. U = {A,B,C}) is depicted
in Fig. 1. Each protocol is modelled by defining USERi to be agent i running the protocol
faithfully.
Schneider’s rank theorem
Rather than proving authentication properties directly, Schneider proposes a method
that allows the network to be separated into its components and analysed ‘locally’. The
first step in this approach is to observe that:
NET sat T authenticates R iff NET |[R ]| Stop sat λtr.tr  T = 〈〉
Parallel composition with Stop blocks NET on performing the events in R. Thus, we
only have to prove that no events in T can be performed in the blocked system in order
to verify the authentication property. This is achieved by constructing an invariant on the
events’ message components. If the invariant holds for every message that can be sent on
the blocked network, but it does not hold for the message components of the events in T
then no such event can occur.
Fig. 1. Communication in a hostile environment—the Dolev–Yao model.
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Fig. 2. Equations for restricted parallel combinations.
A rank function ρ is a mapping from the network’s message space to the set of integers.
The invariant chosen by Schneider is λm.ρ(m)  1. That is, only messages of ‘positive
rank’ are allowed to pass on the network. Since the definition of NET is fixed, Schneider
derives four conditions that are sufficient to prove that this is an invariant of the (blocked)
network; this is Schneider’s rank theorem:
If there exists a function ρ such that
1. ∀m ∈ INIT .ρ(m)  1,
2. ∀S,m.(∀s ∈ S.ρ(s)  1) ∧ S  m ⇒ ρ(m)  1,
3. ∀e ∈ T .ρ(msg(e))  0,
4. ∀i.USERi |[R ]| Stop sat maintains (λm.ρ(m)  1) on i
then
NET sat T authenticates R
where msg(e) extracts the message component from an event e, and maintains I on i is
the following trace predicate:
λtr.∀m ∈ (tr ⇓ rec.i).I (m) ⇒ ∀m ∈ (tr ⇓ trans.i).I (m) 3
The first two conditions ensure that the enemy can only generate messages with a positive
rank, the third condition formalises the invariant’s obligation for the events in T , and the
fourth condition ensures that each agent (blocked on the events in R) maintains the invari-
ant (i.e. if everything received by an agent is of positive rank then everything sent must
also be of positive rank).
A number of proof rules are given in [18] to aid the proof of condition (4)—the condition
that ensures all agents (blocked on the events in R) ‘maintain the rank’. These are rules
concerning the blocking of events in R (examples of these rules are shown in Fig. 2), and
rules for maintaining the rank (examples of these rules are shown in Fig. 3).
Rule restrict.1 states that a process is unaffected by blocking if it cannot perform
an event in R. The rules restrict.2 and restrict.3 describe the effect of blocking on
input and output events.
Rule stop in Fig. 3 states that Stop always maintains the rank. Rule output states that
a process performing an output maintains the rank if the output message is of positive rank
and the process’s subsequent behaviour maintains the rank. Rule input states that a process
performing an input maintains the rank if on the assumption that the message received is
3 tr ⇓ rec.i is the set of messages from the events of tr passed on i’s rec channel.
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Fig. 3. Proof rules for ‘maintaining the rank’.
of positive rank, then the process’s subsequent behaviour maintains the rank. The function
f denotes the pattern matching that occurs at the process interface.
2.3. PVS
PVS [13] is a general purpose tool that provides a formal environment for the develop-
ment and analysis of specifications. A PVS specification consists of one or more ASCII
text files that are prepared, modified and analysed using an Emacs interface. The two main
components of the PVS system are the specification language itself and the interactive
theorem prover.
2.3.1. The PVS specification language
A typical PVS specification consists of a collection of modular units called theories.
A hierarchy of theories is constructed by IMPORTING theories into other theories. This
makes the definitions and theorems of the imported theories available to the importing
theories.
Types
The PVS language is typed. Simple types are constructed from the base types (i.e. bool,
nat, etc.) by using function, [· · · ->· · ·], and tuple, [· · ·,· · ·], constructors. (Sets and pred-
icates are implemented as boolean functions (i.e. functions of type [· · ·-> bool]); the
terms ‘set’, ‘predicate’, and ‘boolean function’ are used interchangeably in this context.)
The versatility of the language is enhanced by allowing uninterpreted type declarations,
predicate subtyping, dependent types, enumerated types and abstract datatypes. The price
paid for such an expressive type system is the undecidability of typechecking: if PVS is
unable to typecheck an expression, it generates one or more proof obligations called type
correctness conditions (TCCs). These must be proven before the expression can be consid-
ered to be well typed. See the PVS Language Reference [14] for a detailed description of
the language.
Constant declarations
A constant declaration refers to a (well-typed) object defined within a theory.
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Formula declarations
A logical formula is a boolean expression that is constructed by using the logical con-
nectives OR, AND, NOT, IMPLIES (=>), IFF, etc. Formulae can also contain variables as long
as they are bound to the universal quantifier FORALL or the existential quantifier EXISTS.
Any free variables are automatically bound to a universal quantifier. A formula declara-
tion associates a formula name with a logical formula via one of the following keywords:
AXIOM, ASSUMPTION, LEMMA, or THEOREM. The differences between these keywords are due
to the proofs of the associated formulae. An AXIOM is not expected to have an associated
proof, an ASSUMPTION is expected to be proved only by an importing theory, and a LEMMA
or a THEOREM (they can be used interchangeably) always requires a proof.
2.3.2. Abstract datatypes
PVS has a mechanism for user-defined (recursive) datatypes. The class of datatypes that
can be defined using this mechanism, see [15], is constrained to ensure that the resulting
definitions and axioms generated by PVS are valid. (The uniformity with which these defi-
nitions and axioms are generated also permits a high degree of automation for the theorem
prover.) In PVS, an abstract datatype is defined in a DATATYPE construct. From this, PVS
generates axioms and definitions that can be used to reason about objects of this type. For
example, a list datatype (whose elements are of a parametric type T) is defined as follows:
list[T : TYPE] : DATATYPE
BEGIN
null : null?
cons(car : T, cdr : list) : cons?
END list
where null and cons are the constructors, car and cdr are accessors that identify the two
arguments of the cons constructor, and null? and cons? are recognisers (functions of type
[list -> bool]) that are true for null-lists and non-null-lists respectively.
Among the axioms generated by PVS is an extensionality axiom (for checking the
equality of two lists), and an induction axiom. Among the constant declarations generated
by PVS is the every function.
every(p : [T -> bool])(l : list) : bool =
CASES l OF
null : TRUE,
cons(hd, tl) : p(hd) AND every(p)(tl)
ENDCASES
This takes a predicate on the list elements and returns a predicate for lists. That is, every(p)
is true for a list all of whose elements satisfy the predicate p; we shall make extensive use of
this function. The CASES · · · ENDCASES expression introduces pattern matching to constant
declarations involving abstract datatypes.
2.3.3. The PVS theorem prover
The proofs of formulae are constructed via the PVS theorem prover. It is primarily used
in an interactive mode whereby a user submits proof commands at a prompt within the
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prover window. The prover maintains a proof tree whose nodes are called proof goals. It is
the aim of the user to close all the branches of the proof tree using the proof commands.
(A branch is closed if its leaf node can be recognised as true by the theorem prover.) See
the PVS Prover Guide [20] for details of the theorem prover.
Each proof goal is a sequent consisting of a list of antecedent formulae followed by a
list of consequent formulae separated by ‘|-------’. Any proof command entered at the
prompt is applied to the ‘current’ proof goal. Intuitively, a sequent can be read as, ‘If the
conjunction of the antecedents is true then the disjunction of the consequents is true.’
A proof begins with a single (root) node whose sequent comprises a single consequent
formula. This formula corresponds to the boolean expression of the formula declaration to
be proved. The proof proceeds in a ‘backward’ manner by the issuing of proof commands
until a trivial sequent is derived. (Some proof commands spawn additional subgoals each
of which has to be tackled separately.)
Proof commands
Primitive proof commands such as flatten, split, inst and skolem! manipulate the
formulae within a sequent at a very low level. It is rare for a PVS user to issue primi-
tive proof commands during a proof. Higher level proof commands called strategies are
combinations of primitive proof steps which reduce the amount of user intervention. For
example, assert is a general purpose strategy for simplifying formulae.
A rewrite rule is a formula declaration that is applied to a proof goal directly using
the rewrite strategy. Rewrite rules are usually equations or one-way implications. If the
rewrite rule is an equation e1 = e2 then rewrite attempts to match an expression in
the proof goal with e1. The first occurrence of such a match is then replaced by e2.
If the rewrite rule is an implication f1 => f2 then rewrite attempts to match f2 with
a consequent formula. If a match is found then f1 is added to the list of consequent
formulae.
User defined strategies
PVS allows users to define their own strategies by combining proof commands so that
‘patterns’ of proof steps can be applied in a single command. User defined strategies are
held in a text file called pvs-strategies.
2.4. A PVS embedding of CSP
A trace semantics for the CSP operators defined in Section 2.1 has been implemented in
PVS [3]. Sets and lists (see Section 2.3.2) are among the pre-defined types provided by the
PVS system, and these form the basis for the implementation. Traces are defined as lists,
and processes are defined as sets of traces. Since the list datatype is polymorphic, we are
not constrained to any specific set of events.
The standard CSP notation cannot be used for this embedding because PVS speci-
fications are ASCII text files. However, PVS has a collection of infix operators which
provide an alternative syntax for CSP processes. The notation for the CSP embedding
in shown in Table 1. The suffix ! of the names Choice and Interleave is a notation
abbreviation provided by PVS that allows names to be treated as binding expressions.
Choice! (i : I) : P(i) is equivalent to Choice(LAMBDA (i : I) : P(i)). (This
shall also be used in conjunction with the every combinator defined in Section 2.3.2.)
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Table 1
The CSP operators in PVS
Operation CSP PVS
Stop Stop Stop
Prefix a → P a >> P
Choice PQ P \/ Q
i ∈ I Pi Choice! (i:I) : P(i)
Parallel P |[A ]|Q Par(A)(P, Q)
Composition P ||| Q P // Q
|[A ]| i ∈ I Pi Par(A)(lambda (i:I) : P(i))
|||i ∈ I Pi Interleave! (i:I) : P(i)
We also introduce a blocking operator # in which P # A is an abbreviation for the pro-
cess Par(A) (P, Stop).
2.4.1. The traces model
A trace is defined to be a list. The empty trace is therefore represented by the empty
list constructor null, and events can be prefixed onto an existing trace using the list con-
structor cons. The prefix relation can be defined in terms of the pre-defined list operation
append:
prefix(t1, t2) : bool = EXISTS t : t2 = append(t1, t)
Recall that the set of traces of a process must fulfil two conditions: the empty trace must
be in the set, and it must be prefix-closed. We define a type process to be a subtype in
which these two conditions are fulfilled:
prefix_closed(S : setof[trace]) : bool =
FORALL t1, t2 : prefix(t1, t2) AND S(t2) IMPLIES S(t1)
process : TYPE = { S : setof[trace] | S(null) AND prefix_closed(S) }
A fixed point operator mu is also defined which, given a monotonic functional F of type
[process -> process], returns its least fixed point mu(F). This is generalised to allow
recursive definitions of parameterised processes.
2.4.2. Trace specifications
The satisfaction relation sat is implemented using the infix operator |>. Recall that any
trace predicate is a legitimate trace specification. Therefore, |> is defined to be a subset
relation between processes P and sets of traces S.
P |> S : bool = subset?(P, S)
One important consequence of this definition is a transitive property between different
trace specifications:
sat_transitive : LEMMA P |> S AND subset?(S, T) IMPLIES P |> T
264 N. Evans, S. Schneider / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 64 (2005) 253–284
An example of a trace specification in PVS is auth(T, R) that implements the property
T authenticates R:
auth(T, R) : setof[trace] =
{ t | proj(t, R) = null IMPLIES proj(t, T) = null }
From this definition, we can prove the following lemma which expresses authentication in
terms of the every combinator and the blocking operator:
authentication_equiv : LEMMA
P |> auth(T, R) IFF P # R |> every(complement(T))
2.5. The (original) rank theorem in PVS
The implementation of the rank theorem in [3] has been used to analyse several authenti-
cation protocols [1,4,6]. However, this implementation has several drawbacks due, to some
extent, to the authors’ adherence to the network model presented in [18].
The first major drawback is the position of the event datatype in the theory hierarchy. Its
location (below the theories that contain the rewrite rules) makes it difficult to analyse other
network models without severe alterations to the theories that lie above it. The next section
develops a set of rewrite rules that are independent of the event datatype and, therefore,
more widely applicable.
The second drawback concerns input and output. The CSP embedding has no notion
of input and output events, yet the rewrite rules interpret (from the agents’ point of view)
trans as an output event and rec as an input event. As we shall see, by abandoning this
preconception, in favour of a notion that we shall informally refer to as delegation, we
can derive a more general set of rewrite rules. For example, we show that the rewrite rules
concerning input and output in [3] (the implementation of rules input and output in Fig.
3) are in fact instances of a single prefix rule.
The final drawback is the proof of the rank theorem itself: it is rather ad hoc and unnec-
essarily complicated. For example, a constraint is introduced which forces all agents to
communicate on their own trans and rec channels. Although this will be the case in gen-
eral, it is not required in the proof of the rank theorem. The generality of the rewrite rules
developed in the next section is demonstrated by using them in the proof of the rank theo-
rem itself!
3. Generalising the rank approach in PVS
The rank approach presented in the previous section considers only one threat model,
in which all users communicate via the enemy on channels called trans and rec. Whilst
it is possible to investigate many situations within this model, from a PVS perspective it is
possible to increase both the flexibility of the approach and the efficiency of its implemen-
tation. By increasing flexibility it is possible to allow users of the system to:
• develop their own threat models,
• declare CSP events that reflect different scenarios,
• have a suite of PVS strategies that can be used more widely,
• construct specialised rank theorems by using the system itself.
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By improving efficiency we aim to raise the level of interaction between the user and
the theorem prover. Ideally, this would involve increasing the amount of automation at
lower, more mundane, levels whilst allowing interaction at a level that is meaningful to the
non-PVS expert.
3.1. Uniform properties
Perhaps the biggest hurdle in generalising the approach is to abandon some of the con-
cepts on which the theory is based. In particular, in the previous section, we spoke of
an agent maintaining the rank if everything received on an input channel has positive rank
implies everything transmitted on an output channel has a positive rank. The CSP operators
defined in PVS (specifically, event prefixing) have no notion of input and output, yet we
have already mentioned an implementation of the rank theorem using PVS. It is, therefore,
possible to define a rank theorem in a setting that is without a notion of input and output.
By abandoning this notion we treat all events in a uniform manner and, as a consequence,
define proof rules that are independent of specific events. The remainder of this section
concerns the development of these rules.
The whole approach, as defined in the previous section, centres on the construction
of a rank function that maps all messages that are allowed to pass on a network to a
positive integer, and maps all messages that are forbidden on the network to a non-positive
integer. Rather than using all integers as the range of the rank function, the ‘revised’
definition in [8] restricts the range to the values ‘1’ (representing all positive values) and
‘0’ (representing all non-positive values). We shall use this revision by defining a rank
function that maps messages to boolean values. Using the every combinator defined in
Section 2.3.2, the central property of a (boolean) rank function rho can be expressed
as:
every! e : rho(msg(e))
That is, the message component of every event e satisfies rho. Properties of this form
(for lists and other algebraic datatypes) are investigated in [10] using the collective term
‘uniform properties’.
3.2. Rewrite rules for uniform properties
In an authentication context, we want to show that a process P blocked on a set of events
R satisfies the rank property. That is, we want to prove:
P # R |> every! e : rho(msg(e))
A proof of this can be achieved by splitting the process P into its subcomponents. We will
consider each CSP operator in turn to construct rewrite rules for formulae such as this.
We begin by constructing rules for uniform properties of the form every(p). We shall
discover that we also need to consider properties of the form LAMBDA t : every(p)(t)
=> every(q)(t), for event predicates p and q. It is easy to see that the first form is an
instance of the second (since every(TRUE)(t) = TRUE), but we shall consider each of
these forms separately.
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There are two kinds of rewrite rule that we shall construct. The first kind deals with
the blocking of a process on an arbitrary set of events R. Some of these rules are given in
Fig. 2 under the heading ‘rules for restricted parallel combinations’; a complete set of rules
is given in this section. The second kind of rewrite rule concerns the uniform properties
stated above. Since the rank property defined above is one instance, these rules are used
extensively in proofs of security properties, as well as in the proof of the rank theorem
itself.
Stop
The rules for this process are straightforward because blocking has no effect, and prop-
erties of the form every(p) are vacuously true for the null trace:
restriction_stop : LEMMA Stop # R = Stop
uniform_stop : LEMMA Stop |> every(p)
Event prefixing
If this process a >> P is blocked on a set R containing the event a then it deadlocks
immediately (i.e. it is equivalent to Stop) otherwise the event a is allowed to happen, and
blocking can be restricted to P.
restriction_prefix : LEMMA
(a >> P) # R = IF R(a) THEN Stop ELSE a >> (P # R) ENDIF
This rule resembles restrict.3 in Fig. 2. A prefixed process a >> P satisfies a prop-
erty every(p) if, and only if, the predicate p holds for a and P satisfies the property.
uniform_prefix : LEMMA
a >> P |> every(p) IFF p(a) AND P |> every(p)
External choice
Blocking distributes over each of the choice operators:
restriction_choice : LEMMA
(P1 \/ P2) # R = (P1 # R) \/ (P2 # R)
restriction_choice3 : LEMMA
(Choice! i : P(i)) # R = Choice! i : (P(i) # R)
Similarly, a process consisting of a choice of subprocesses satisfies a property every(p)
if, and only if, each individual subprocess satisfies the property.
uniform_choice : LEMMA
P1 \/ P2 |> every(p) IFF P1 |> every(p) AND P2 |> every(p)
uniform3_choice : LEMMA
Choice! i : P(i) |> every(p) IFF FORALL i : P(i) |> every(p)
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Parallel composition
Each parallel operator is parameterised by a synchronising set of A. Once again, we
define two blocking rules that distribute the blocking over all operand processes.
restriction_par : LEMMA
Par(A)(P1, P2) # R = Par(A)(P1 # R, P2 # R)
restriction_par2 : LEMMA
Par(A)(lambda i : P(i)) # R = Par(A)(lambda i : P(i) # R)
The problem of establishing every(p) for a parallel process can be split into two sub-
cases: by considering the events that are members of the synchronising set A and the events
that are not members separately, we derive the following lemma from the definition of
every:
parallel_property1 : LEMMA
Par(A)(P1, P2) |> every(p) IFF
Par(A)(P1, P2) |> every! e : (NOT A(e) => p(e)) AND
Par(A)(P1, P2) |> every! e : (A(e) => p(e))
The events that are not in A do not require synchronisation, and both P1 and P2 must be
shown to satisfy every! e : (NOT A(e) => p(e)):
parallel_property2 : LEMMA
P1 |> every! e : (NOT A(e) => p(e)) AND
P2 |> every! e : (NOT A(e) => p(e))
IMPLIES
Par(A)(P1, P2) |> every! e : (NOT A(e) => p(e))
Since all events in A require synchronisation then if either P1 or P2 satisfies the property
every! e : (A(e) => p(e)) then their parallel composition will satisfy the property.
However, it is unrealistic to expect one of the subprocesses to take sole responsibility for
achieving this. One alternative is for each subprocesses P1 and P2 to delegate responsibility
for a subset of the events in A so that in combination they satisfy the property: if, on the
assumption that p holds for a set of delegated events, it can be shown that p holds for
all other events then the parallel composition satisfies every(p). Note that the scope of
this assumption includes the events not in A and, as a consequence, this rule subsumes
parallel_property2. We call this rewrite rule uniform_par (note the two delegating
sets B1 and B2 must be disjoint):
uniform_par : LEMMA
EXISTS B1, B2 :
subset?(B1, A) AND subset?(B2, A) AND disjoint?(B1, B2) AND
P1 |> LAMBDA t : (every! e : B1(e) => p(e))(t) =>
(every! e : complement(B1)(e) => p(e))(t) AND
P2 |> LAMBDA t : (every! e : B2(e) => p(e))(t) =>
(every! e : complement(B2)(e) => p(e))(t)
IMPLIES
Par(A)(P1, P2) |> every(p)
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The prefix-closed nature of processes breaks the apparent circularity of this lemma. Also
note that we have now introduced two properties of the form LAMBDA t : every(p)(t)
=> every(q)(t).
Each step in the derivation of uniform_par can be generalised to define a rule for
indexed parallel composition. Instead of two delegating sets we need an indexed collection
of (disjoint) delegating sets.
uniform2_par : LEMMA
EXISTS B : FORALL i : subset?(B(i), A) AND
intersection(B) = emptyset AND
FORALL i :
P(i) |> LAMBDA t : (every! e : B(i)(e) => p(e))(t) =>
(every! e : complement(B(i))(e) => p(e))(t)
IMPLIES
Par(A)(LAMBDA i : P(i)) |> every(p)
The blocking rules for general parallel composition are applicable to interleaved pro-
cesses. The rules uniform_par and uniform2_par are used to prove the corresponding
rules for interleaving:
uniform_interleave : LEMMA
P1 // P2 |> every(p) IFF P1 |> every(p) AND P2 |> every(p)
uniform2_interleave : LEMMA
Interleave! i : P(i) |> every(p) IFF
FORALL i : P(i) |> every(p)
Fixed points
All of the blocking rules that have been considered up to this point have manipulated a
blocked process by moving the restriction to its subprocesses. However, this does not work
for fixed point definitions (see [5] for a counterexample). Instead, the following rules are
defined for the blocking of fixed point processes:
restriction_fix : LEMMA
(FORALL X : F(X) # R = F(X # R) # R) IMPLIES
mu(F) # R = mu(LAMBDA P : (F(P) # R))
restriction_fix2 : LEMMA
(FORALL X :
(FORALL i : F(X)(i) # R = F(LAMBDA i : (X(i) # R))(i) # R))
IMPLIES
(mu(F)(i) # R) = (mu(LAMBDA P : (LAMBDA i : (F(P)(i) # R)))(i))
In both rules, the hypothesis means, in effect, that F is only allowed to extend traces by
prefixing additional events. It cannot manipulate traces by, for example, renaming events;
these rules are sufficient for our purposes.
In order to prove that a (parameterless) recursive process mu(F) satisfies a property of
the form every(p), it is sufficient to find a stronger event predicate p1 (i.e. for all events
e, p1(e) => p(e)) such that every(p1) can be proved by fixed point induction:
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uniform_fix1 : LEMMA
(EXISTS p1 : (FORALL e : p1(e) => p(e)) AND
(FORALL X : X |> every(p1) IMPLIES F(X) |> every(p1)))
IMPLIES
mu(F) |> every(p)
For parameterised recursive processes we get a similar rule. Note that the event predi-
cates all occur within the scope of universally quantified variables. This allows the event
predicates to be dependent on the process’s parameter.
uniform2_fix : LEMMA
(EXISTS p1 : (FORALL e : p1(i)(e) IMPLIES p(e)) AND
FORALL X : (FORALL i : X(i) |> every(p1(i))) IMPLIES




Recall that the rules for parallel composition yield uniform properties of the form
LAMBDA t : every(p)(t) => every(q)(t). It is therefore necessary to derive rules for
these properties too. The prefixing rule is particularly interesting because the input and
output rules of Fig. 3 are both instances of the same rule. That is, we now have a single
rewrite rule that does not discriminate between input and output:
uniform_prefix2 : LEMMA
p(e) => (q(e) AND P |> LAMBDA t : every(p)(t) => every(q)(t))
IMPLIES e >> P |> LAMBDA t : every(p)(t) => every(q)(t)
3.3. Strategies for the rewrite rules
A set of PVS strategies have been constructed to control the application of the numer-
ous rewrite rules presented above. Each strategy corresponds to a particular CSP opera-
tor. For example, the strategy for binary parallel composition is called parallel, fix2 is
the strategy for parameterised fixed point definitions, and interleaving2 is the strategy
for indexed interleaving. (The definitions of these and the other strategies can be found
in [5].)
3.4. Deriving a rank theorem in PVS
We now use the strategies highlighted above to derive a rank theorem for a specific net-
work model—the ‘Dolev–Yao’ model described in Section 2.2 (i.e. the network architec-
ture depicted in Fig. 1 generalised to an arbitrary number of agents). However, in addition
to the trans and rec channels, we include a new channel called leak on which the enemy
can pass any message that it is capable of generating. This channel can be used in the
analysis of secrecy properties (as demonstrated in [5]). We define a datatype called event
to represent the alphabet of the CSP processes:
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event : DATATYPE
BEGIN
trans(snd, rcv : I, msg : M) : trans?
rec(rcv, snd : I, msg : M) : rec?
leak(msg : M) : leak?
END event
The types I and M are parameters representing agent identities and messages respectively.
The network is, therefore, defined to be polymorphic with respect to these types.
Next we define the enemy. Recall, this is a recursive process that is parameterised by a
set of messages. Any message that is received (via the trans channel) is added to the set of
messages. Only messages generated from the current set of messages using the generates
relation |- can be sent on the rec and leak channels.
F(X)(S) : process =
(Choice! i, j, m : trans(i, j, m) >> X(add(m, S)))
\/ (Choice! i, j, (m | S |- m) : rec(i, j, m) >> X(S))
\/ (Choice! (m | S |- m) : leak(m) >> X(S))
enemy : [setof[M] -> process] = mu(F)
We introduce a parameter for the network (called users) that maps agent identities to
processes. For each protocol that is to be analysed using this network architecture, this
parameter can be instantiated accordingly.
network(users) : process =
Par(union(trans?, rec?))(enemy(INIT), Interleave(users))
We now derive Schneider’s rank theorem using the PVS theorem prover. By submitting
network(users) |> auth(T, R) to the theorem prover, we use the strategies to obtain
the conditions of the theorem:
|-------




{1} network(users) # R |> every(complement(T))
This sequent can be expressed in terms of a rank property by introducing and instantiating
the lemma sat_transitive defined in Section 2.4.2:
{-1} FORALL (E, F: setof[trace], P: process):
(P |> E) AND subset?(E, F) IMPLIES (P |> F)
|-------
[1] network(users) # R |> every(complement(T))
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Rule? (INST -1 "every! e: rho(msg(e))" "every(complement(T))"
"network(users!1) # R")
This simplifies to:
{-1} (network(users) # R |> every! e: rho(msg(e))) AND
subset?(every! e: rho(msg(e)), every(complement(T)))
IMPLIES (network(users) # R |> every(complement(T)))
|-------




{1} (network(users) # R |> every! e: rho(msg(e))) AND
subset?(every! e: rho(msg(e)), every(complement(T)))
If we split this formula, we get two subgoals. The first subgoal demands that all messages
passing on the blocked network belong to rho. The second requires the set of traces that
satisfy every! e: rho(msg(e)) to be a subset of the set of traces satisfying every(com-
plement(T)). In other words, the messages of the events of T are not members of rho.
Maintaining the rank
The first of these two subgoals is in a form that is amenable to our proof strategies.
The strategy parallel is used to split the network into two subcomponents: the enemy
and the agents. We delegate responsibility for all trans events to the agents, and delegate
responsibility for all rec events to the enemy (leak is not delegated because it is not in the
synchronising set):
|-------




{1} EXISTS (B1: set[event]), (B2: set[event]):
subset?(B1, union(trans?, rec?))
AND subset?(B2, union(trans?, rec?))
AND disjoint?(B1, B2)
AND enemy(INIT) # R |>
LAMBDA t : every! e : (B1(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>
every! e : (complement(B1)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t)
AND Interleave(users) # R |>
LAMBDA t : every! e : (B2(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>
every! e : (complement(B2)(e) => rho(msg(e)))(t)
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Rule? (inst 1 "trans?" "rec?")
This simplifies to:
|-------
{1} subset?(trans?, union(trans?, rec?))
AND subset?(rec?, union(trans?, rec?))
AND disjoint?(trans?, rec?)
AND enemy(INIT) # R |>
LAMBDA t : every! e : (trans?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>
every! e : (complement(trans?)(e) => rho(msg(e)))(t)
AND Interleave(users) # R |>
LAMBDA t : every! e : (rec?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>
every! e : (complement(rec?)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t)
This is simplified to obtain two subgoals that require us to prove that the blocked enemy
and the interleaved, blocked agents maintain the rank.
The enemy maintains the rank
In an authentication analysis, the effect of blocking the enemy on performing the events
in R is negligible because the behaviour of the enemy is so unconstrained. Thus, we dis-
card the block and continue to derive the conditions necessary to prove that the enemy
maintains the rank. Since the enemy is defined as a parameterised fixed point (of the func-
tional F), the fix2 strategy is used in the proof of the following sequent:
|-------
{1} enemy(INIT) |>
LAMBDA t : every! e : (trans?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>





LAMBDA t : every! e : (trans?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>
every! e : (complement(trans?)(e) => rho(msg(e)))(t)
Rule? (fix2)
This yields 2 subgoals:
|-------
{1} EXISTS (q1: [setof[M] -> pred[event]]),
(q2: [setof[M] -> pred[event]]):
(FORALL e :
((trans?(e) => rho(msg(e))) => q1(INIT)(e)) AND
(q2(INIT)(e) =>
complement(trans?)(e) => rho(msg(e)))) AND
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(FORALL (P: [setof[M] -> process]):
(FORALL (S: setof[M]):
P(S) |> (LAMBDA t : every(q1(S))(t) => every(q2(S))(t)))
IMPLIES
(FORALL (S: setof[M]): F(P)(S) |>
(LAMBDA t : every(q1(S))(t) => every(q2(S))(t))))
We are required to instantiate the variables q1 and q2 so that the property LAMBDA t :
every(q1(i))(t) => every(q2(i))(t) is preserved by the application of F. A suitable
instantiation for q1 is
LAMBDA S : LAMBDA e : (trans?(e) => rho(msg(e)))
The instantiation for q2 is a bit more complicated because it deals with the enemy’s rec
and leak events. These events are dependent on the set of messages and the generates rela-
tion. As the set of messages increases with each trans event, we require a parameterised
event predicate that can accommodate this expansion. We therefore choose the following
instantiation for q2:
LAMBDA S : LAMBDA e :
(complement(trans?)(e) AND subset?(S, rho)) =>
(EXISTS S1 : subset?(S1, rho) AND S1 |- msg(e))
The existentially quantified variable S1 gives us flexibility with regard to the set of mes-
sages. In simple terms, this predicate says that the messages occurring in all rec and leak
events are generated from a subset of the messages in rho. This predicate is only suitable
if the following two conditions hold:
• subset?(INIT, rho)
• FORALL S, m : subset?(S, rho) AND (S |- m) IMPLIES rho(m)
The agents maintain the rank
Since the agents are undefined, we cannot do much to simplify the following sequent.
The only strategy available to us is the interleaving2 strategy. This results in a formula
that cannot be reduced any further:
|-------
{1} Interleave(users) # R |>
LAMBDA t : every! e : (rec?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>




{1} users(i) # R |>
LAMBDA t : every! e : (rec?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>
every! e : (complement(rec?)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t)
Thus, every agent i must be shown to maintain the rank.
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The events in T
The remaining subgoal concerns the events in the set T:
|-------
{1} subset?(every! e: rho(msg(e)), every(complement(T)))
This is true if the message of an event in T is not a member of rho:
• FORALL (e: (T)): NOT rho(msg(e))
The rank theorem
By combining the results above, we obtain the following rank theorem:
authentication_by_rank : THEOREM
subset?(INIT, rho) AND
FORALL S, m : subset?(S, rho) AND (S |- m) IMPLIES rho(m) AND
FORALL i : users(i) # R |> RankUser(rho) AND
FORALL (e : (T)) : NOT rho(msg(e))
IMPLIES
network(users) |> auth(T, R)
where RankUser(rho) is defined as follows:
RankUser(rho) : setof[trace[event]] =
LAMBDA t : every! e : (rec?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) =>
every! e : (complement(rec?)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t)
This theorem coincides with the rank theorem defined in Section 2.2.
4. Dolev–Yao variations 1: Non-repudiation
In this section we shall define an alternative network model to investigate certain proper-
ties of a non-repudiation protocol proposed by Zhou and Gollmann in [21]. The properties
of the non-repudiation protocol that we can investigate are those that can be analysed by
using rank functions. Thus, we are concerned with the safety aspects of the protocol (i.e.
the non-repudiation of origin properties).
Since non-repudiation is different from authentication, the motivation for analysing
non-repudiation protocols is not to establish the correctness of the protocols specifically.
Rather, the analysis is done in order to assess the strength of the evidence that can be
generated by the agents. Such protocols are used to provide evidence that can be submitted
to a judge so that other agents cannot successfully deny having sent or received a message.
The Zhou–Gollmann protocol
This protocol aims to provide non-repudiation evidence for an originator A sending a
message M to a recipient B. There are two stages to the protocol: the first stage is the
communication, from A to B, of the message M encrypted using a key K generated by the
originator A. Non-repudiation of origin evidence is provided by A signing the encrypted
message. On receipt, B provides non-repudiation of receipt evidence by signing the en-
crypted message and sending it back to A. When A has received this evidence, the second
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stage involves the distribution of the key K that will enable B to get M . A submits K to
a trusted third party T T P who makes the key (signed by the trusted third party) available
to both A and B via ftp-get operations. A is required to retrieve this key in order to get
the evidence needed for non-repudiation of receipt: if A is capable of retrieving K via an
ftp-get, it is assumed that B can also get the key. This protocol is analysed in [5].
Non-repudiation in PVS
The model for non-repudiation is orthogonal to the Dolev–Yao model: in a non-repu-
diation setting, it is the agents that have the potential to misbehave, whilst the medium is
reliable. However, properties concerning non-repudiation of origin (NRO) are very similar
to event-based authentication properties: one agent’s receipt of a message (that can be
submitted as a piece of evidence to the judge) guarantees that another (specific) agent sent
it.
4.1. A network definition for NRO
We shall use the network architecture depicted in Fig. 4. The agents (including A and
B shown in the diagram), the medium, and the trusted third party (T T P ) are defined as
CSP processes. Note that the evidence channels in the diagram are unconnected at one
end. In CSP, this corresponds to communication with an environment that is external to the
model. In our case, it means that we do not model the judge as a CSP process. Thus, we are
not analysing the capabilities of the judge; we are analysing the strength of the evidence
submitted to the judge.
Fig. 4. The Network Architecture for the ZG protocol.
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We begin by defining the events of the processes as an abstract datatype:
event : DATATYPE
BEGIN
trans(snd, rcv : I, msg : M) : trans?
rec(rcv, snd : I, msg : M) : rec?
ftp(id : I, msg : M) : ftp?
evidence(id : I, msg : M) : evidence?
END event
The trans and rec channels each have two identity fields. This is necessary for the medium
to determine the source and destination of messages passed on these channels.
4.1.1. The medium
Unlike the enemy, we assume that the medium is reliable: any message sent to the
medium is made available to the intended recipient of the message (and no-one else). Once
a message has been passed on, it is removed from the medium. This is reflected in the
following definition:
F(X)(S) : process =
(Choice! i, j, m : trans(i, j, m) >> X(add((j, i, m), S)))
\/ (Choice! (t | S(t)) : rec(t‘1, t‘2, t‘3) >> X(remove(t, S)))
medium : [setof[[I, I, M]] -> process] = mu(F)
where add puts an element (a triple in this case) into a set, and remove deletes an element
from a set. The parameter S represents the set of transmitted messages that have yet to
reach their destinations. Note that the source and destination fields of the trans event
are swapped when they are added to S. The rec event is constructed by projecting the
components of a triple.
4.1.2. The agents
All agents have the potential to misbehave: each agent i is parameterised by a set of
messages and has a generates relation |-(i) by which he creates messages. An agent
can receive any message (which is then added to its set) and is willing to transmit any
message that can be generated (from its set) to anyone. In addition to this, an agent is
willing to accept any message on its ftp channel, and it can submit any message that can
be generated from its set as evidence.
G(u)(Y)(Su) : process =
(Choice! j, m : rec(u, j, m) >> Y(add(m, Su)))
\/ (Choice! m : ftp(u, m) >> Y(add(m, Su)))
\/ (Choice! (m | |-(u)(Su, m)) : evidence(u, m) >> Y(Su))
\/ (Choice! j, (m | |-(u)(Su, m)) : trans(u, j, m) >> Y(Su))
user(Su)(u) : process = (mu(G(u))(Su))
The parameter u is the identity of an agent, and Su represents the agent’s set of messages.
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4.1.3. The Network
The agents and the trusted third party communicate directly via the ftp channels. They
can also communicate with each other indirectly via the medium. Since the trusted third
party is uninterpreted at this stage, we define the network as a process that is parameterised
by the trusted third party’s process:
network(TTP) : process =
Par(union(trans?, rec?))(medium(emptyset),
Par(ftp?)((Interleave! u : user(INIT(u))(u)), TTP))
The theory parameter INIT is a function that maps an agent’s identity to a message set that
represents the messages that are in the agent’s possession initially.
4.2. A rank theorem for NRO
Since we have restricted ourselves to the safety aspects of the ZG protocol, we are once
again interested in proving properties of the form auth(T, R). For non-repudiation, only
evidence events should be allowed in T because our aim is to evaluate the strength of
the evidence that can be passed to the judge (i.e. to establish what can be deduced from
the evidence in T). We choose to constrain the theory so that T is a set consisting of one
evidence event. The intention is to use a specialised rank theorem to get a minimal set
of events that must be included in R (the blocking set) in order to prove that the network
meets the specification. The events in R correspond to the possible events that could cause
the piece of evidence in T to be submitted. Thus, the evidence in T is weaker as the size of
R increases.
We begin the development of a rank theorem for non-repudiation by defining a function
T that maps an agent’s identity i and a message m to a singleton set consisting of the event
evidence(i, m).
T(i, m) : setof[event] = singleton(evidence(i, m))
For an arbitrary set R, we want to build a rank theorem by which we can prove properties
of the form:
network(TTP) |> auth(T(i, m), R)
To do this, we repeat the first steps of the proof of authentication_by_rank described in
the previous section. However, since the definition of T is restricted to a single evidence
event with a specific agent’s identity, i, we can ignore all other evidence channels. That
is, rather than showing that the entire network, blocked on the events in R, maintains the
rank, we only have to show that the messages passing on all of the channels except these
redundant evidence channels maintain the rank. If we capture these evidence channels as a
set of events:
not_redundant_evidence(i) : setof[event] =
complement({ e | EXISTS j, m : j /= i AND e = evidence(j, m) })
then we want to show that the network blocked on R satisfies the following trace property:
every! e : (not_redundant_evidence(i))(e) => rho(msg(e))
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Once again, we can use the strategies to separate the network process into its compo-
nents. This process consists of a nested parallel combination, and we are required to use
the parallel2 strategy twice in order to separate the network components completely.
This results in a delegation of responsibility for the events among the agents, the trusted
third party and the medium. The medium delegates responsibility for all trans events
to the agents and the trusted third party. The agents and the trusted third party delegate
responsibility for the rec events to the medium. Finally, the agents delegate responsibility
for the ftp events to the trusted third party. Thus, we define the following three trace
properties:
RankMedium(rho) : setof[trace[event]] =
LAMBDA tr :
(every! e : trans?(e) => rho(msg(e)))(tr) =>
(every! e : complement(trans?)(e) => rho(msg(e)))(tr)
RankUser(i, rho) : setof[trace[event]] =
LAMBDA tr :
(every! e : union(rec?, ftp?)(e) => rho(msg(e)))(tr) =>
(every! e : complement(union(rec?, ftp?))(e) =>
(not_redundant_evidence(i)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(tr)
RankTTP(i, rho) : setof[trace[event]] =
LAMBDA tr :
(every! e : rec?(e) => rho(msg(e)))(tr) =>
(every! e : complement(rec?)(e) =>
(not_redundant_evidence(i)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(tr)
Now, in order to prove network(TTP) |> auth(T(i, m), R), it is sufficient to prove
the following four subgoals:
1. medium(emptyset) |> RankMedium(rho)
2. FORALL u : user(INIT(u))(u) # R |> RankUser(i, rho)
3. TTP # R |> RankTTP(i, rho)
4. NOT rho(m)
The first of these is true whatever the rank function because a medium that is empty
initially will continue to maintain the rank. The other conditions obviously depend on rho,
and result in the following rank theorem that we call nonrepudiation_by_rank:
nonrepudiation_by_rank : THEOREM
FORALL u : user(INIT(u))(u) # R |> RankUser(i, rho) AND
TTP # R |> RankTTP(i, rho) AND
NOT rho(m)
IMPLIES
network(TTP) |> auth(T(i, m), R)
The results of the analysis of ZG in [5] require the assumption that agents do not reveal
their private keys.
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5. Dolev–Yao variations 2: Adding time
In this section we shall introduce event-based (discrete) time to the network model.
By using discrete time, rather than real time, we can continue to use our proof strategies.
Thus, no modifications to the CSP embedding are required to analyse event-based timed
properties of security protocols. Discrete time is modelled in CSP by introducing a special
event tock. The resulting language is called tock-CSP. The event tock is used to represent
the passage of one unit of time, and it requires synchronisation by all processes in the
system to reflect the fact that time passes at the same rate in all processes. Detailed accounts
of event-based time, can be found in [17,19].
5.1. Timed processes
We augment the original Dolev–Yao model of the network by adding timed behaviour.
The revised enemy is simply the original enemy with no time-critical behaviour. However,
an agents’ behaviour can be sensitive to time for a number of reasons:
• The messages they produce can depend on the current time (e.g. timestamps), and so
the agents will have to be described explicitly in tock-CSP. They will also need to keep
track of the current time, and increment its value on every tock.
• The response to a particular message might depend on the relationship between the
current time and a time value within the message (to check that it is recent enough).
• The implementation of the protocol might include other time-dependent behaviour such
as timeouts or explicit delays.
Furthermore, time can be introduced into the authentication properties that need to be
checked. It may be necessary to check that a message received was in fact sent relatively
recently; or perhaps that an entire protocol run has taken no more than a certain amount
of time. If timestamps appear in the messages then such properties can be expressed
within the existing framework. For example, if m is a message and l is a timestamp, then
{rec.B.A.m.l} might be used to authenticate {trans.A.B.m.l′ | l − d  l′  l}. In other
words, m was sent no more than d time units ago.
We begin by adding the event tock to the event datatype. Note that this event has no
message component and, as such, the rank theorem for timed networks must be redefined.
event : DATATYPE
BEGIN
trans(snd, rcv : I, msg : M) : trans?
rec(rcv, snd : I, msg : M) : rec?
leak(msg : M) : leak?
tock : tock?
END event
The enemy is defined as follows:
F(X)(S) : process =
(Choice! i, j, m : trans(i, j, m) >> X(add(m, S)))
\/ (Choice! i, j, (m | (S |- m)) : rec(i, j, m) >> X(S))
\/ (Choice! (m | (S |- m)) : leak(m) >> X(S))
\/ (tock >> X(S))
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enemy : [setof[M] -> process] = mu(F)
In tock-CSP, the network is defined to be the tock-synchronised parallel combination
of the network components:
network(users) : process =
Par(union(union(trans?, rec?), tock?))
(enemy(INIT), Par(tock?)(users))
5.2. A rank theorem for the model
Prior to the addition of time, our invariant for the Dolev–Yao network was that all
messages passing on the network were members of the set rho. Since every event had
a message component, this was defined in PVS as the following trace property:
every! e : rho(msg(e))
In the timed setting, we have introduced the event tock that does not contain a mes-
sage component. This invariant is no longer applicable because msg(tock) is meaning-
less (it does not typecheck). We therefore define a timed invariant in which the message
components of all events except tock are members of rho:
every! e : complement(tock?)(e) => rho(msg(e))
The type conflict is now avoided because PVS typechecks the expression rho(msg(e))
under the assumption that e /= tock.
Once again, we construct a rank theorem to prove properties of the form auth(T, R).
We derive a theorem that is almost identical to that of the untimed network:
authentication_by_rank : THEOREM
subset?(INIT, rho)
AND (FORALL S, m : subset?(S, rho) AND (S |- m) IMPLIES rho(m))
AND (FORALL i : users(i) # R |> RankUser(rho))
AND (FORALL (e : (T)) : NOT rho(msg(e)))
IMPLIES
network(users) |> auth(T, R)
where RankUser(rho) is defined as:
RankUser(rho) : setof[trace[event]] =
LAMBDA tr : (every! e : rec?(e) => rho(msg(e)))(tr) =>
(every! e : complement(union(rec?, tock?))(e) =>
rho(msg(e)))(tr)
The only difference is an additional constraint on the set T: it must not contain the event
tock. This is not only the consequence of a type conflict, it is also necessary in the proof
of the theorem. We are required to show that the timed invariant given above is stronger
than the trace property every(complement(T)). This is the case if, for every event e:
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(complement(tock?)(e) => rho(msg(e))) IMPLIES NOT T(e)
If tock is a member of T then the hypothesis of the implication would be true and the
consequent would be false. Hence, we are obliged to forbid this.
5.3. A timed example: The (corrected) Wide–Mouthed Frog protocol
The Wide–Mouthed Frog protocol is a simple two-pass protocol that uses timestamps.
Its aim is to send a session key from one agent to another via a server. The corrected version
of this protocol is defined as follows:
1. A → S : A, {B, T a,Kab, i}Kas .
2. S → B : {A, T s,Kab, r}Kbs .
Here, the agent A initiates a run of the protocol by sending message (1) to the server
S. On receipt of this message, the server checks that the value of the timestamp T a
is acceptably close to the ‘current’ time. If this is the case then the server constructs
message (2), generating a new timestamp T s, and sends it to the intended recipient B.
If this message is received within an acceptable time period (i.e. T s is deemed to be
recent) then B is willing to use Kab as a session key with A. Note, the protocol uses
shared key encryption for secure communication with the server. The message compo-
nents i and r are ‘direction bits’ that are required to distinguish the first message from the
second.
In this example, we consider a network with only three agents: an initiator A, a respon-
der B, and a server S. (In general we are not constrained by a finite number of agents.) The
agents are defined in the PVS embedding as follows:
FUserA(X)(n) : process =
trans(A, S, E(Kas, conc(A, conc4(B, n, Kab, i)))) >> RUN(tock)
\/ tock >> X(n + 1)
UserA : [nat -> process] = mu(FUserA)
FUserB(X)(n) : process =
Choice!(k, (n’ | n’ >= n - d AND n >= n’)) :
rec(B, S, E(Kbs, conc4(A, n’, k, r))) >> RUN(tock)
\/ tock >> X(n + 1)
UserB : [nat -> process] = mu(FUserB)
FServer(X)(n) : process =
Choice!(k, (n’ | n’ >= n - d AND n >= n’)) :
rec(S, A, E(Kas, conc(A, conc4(B, n’, k, i)))) >>
trans(S, B, E(Kbs, conc4(A, n, k, r))) >> RUN(tock)
\/ tock >> X(n + 1)
Server : [nat -> process] = mu(FServer)
users : process =
Par(tock?)(Par(tock?)(UserA(0), UserB(0)), Server(0))
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where the natural number parameter n of each process acts as a clock recording the ‘cur-
rent’ time, E is the encryption function (whose arguments are the encryption key and the
message to be encrypted), and conc and conc4 concatenate two and four messages respec-
tively. The process users sets all clocks to zero and forces all agents to synchronise on
tock events. The process RUN(tock) allows time to pass freely once an agent has com-
pleted its run.
The enemy’s initial set of messages INIT contains all agent identities, all session keys
except Kab and all timestamps (i.e. the natural numbers). The generates relation is defined
to give the enemy process reasonable capabilities:
S |- m : INDUCTIVE bool =
(S(m)) OR
(EXISTS m1, m2 : S |- m1 AND S |- m2 AND m = conc(m1, m2)) OR
(EXISTS m1 : S |- conc(m, m1)) OR
(EXISTS m1 : S |- conc(m1, m)) OR
(EXISTS k, m1 : S |- k AND S |- m1 AND m = E(k, m1))
An obvious property that we would like to check is whenever B performs its rec event
then A initiated the protocol no more than d time units ago. This can be formalised by
instantiating the sets T and R in the trace specification auth(T, R) as follows:
T = { e | e = rec(B, S, E(Kbs, conc4(A, t, Kab, r))) }
R = { e | EXISTS (t’ | t’ >= t - d AND t >= t’) :
e = trans(A, S, conc(A, E(Kas, conc4(B, t, Kab, i)))) }
In a rank analysis, we aim to show that, by blocking A on initiating the protocol at time t
- d until time t, the event in T cannot occur. Our approach to constructing a rank function is
to define an uninterpreted function rho and use the rank theorem and our suite of strategies
to derive the conditions that rho must fulfil. Any inconsistency in these conditions indicates
a flaw in the protocol with respect to the property under investigation.
The first hypothesis of the rank theorem states that INIT must be a subset of rho. There-
fore, rho must contain all agent identities , all session keys except possibly Kab and all
timestamps. The second hypothesis states that only messages belonging to rho can be
generated from subsets of rho. Thus, for example, the concatenation of two messages in
rho forms a message that is also in rho.
The strategies are used to show that the agents maintain the rank. The prefix strat-
egy, that uses the rewrite rule uniform_prefix2, tells us that UserA maintains the rank if
rho(E(Kas, conc4(B, n, Kab, i))). However, since the network is blocked on R, this
only needs to be true when the timestamp n is less than t - d or greater than t. UserB
maintains the rank simply because it does not send anything. By using the same prefix
strategy (twice), Server maintains the rank if, for all session keys k and all timestamps n,
n’:
rho(E(Kas, conc4(B, n, k, i))) => rho(E(Kbs, conc4(A, n’, k, r)))
where n is greater than n’ - d and less than n’.
The final hypothesis states that rho(E(Kbs, conc4(A, t, Kab, r))) must not be in
rho. Collectively, these conditions are consistent and rho can be defined accordingly in
PVS. Therefore, the property holds.
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6. Summary
The rank function approach has, for some time, been used in the formal analysis of
authentication protocols. More recently, its PVS implementation has been developed to
provide a more flexible, interactive environment in which a wider range of security prop-
erties (not only authentication) can be analysed. The work presented here originated from
the desire to allow such properties to be addressed within a single framework. However,
this result has also impacted on the theory that underlies the approach.
The realisation that the central rank property is an instance of a more general class of
‘uniform’ properties has enabled the development of a suite of powerful yet flexible rewrite
rules for the rank approach. In particular, we have abandoned the partitioning of events in
favour of a more general notion that we have called delegation. As a consequence, rewrite
rules for parallel composition have been introduced, and separate prefixing rules for input
and output have been replaced by a single, general purpose rule. Hence, the rules, and the
rank approach itself, are now polymorphic with respect to events.
The versatility of the rules is demonstrated by using them to derive three specialised
rank theorems for three different types of security analysis. Therefore, we have a collec-
tion of rewrite rules that, in addition to their role in the construction of rank functions for
specific protocol analyses, can be used in the proofs that support the approach itself.
Another approach that also uses rank functions is Heather’s RankAnalyser tool [7]. This
tool automatically verifies authentication properties for a somewhat restricted class of pro-
tocols. Our results increase the range of protocols that are amenable to a rank analysis. In a
wider context, security protocols have been investigated using other CSP-based techniques.
Casper (see, for example, [11]) is used in conjunction with the model checker FDR to find
attacks on security protocols. Other theorem provers have also been used to analyse secu-
rity protocols. A well-known example is Paulson’s inductive method [16] which has been
implemented in the Isabelle theorem prover. This approach is comparable to performing
a (highly automated) authentication analysis directly within the traces model. Our use of
rank functions to verify trace properties demands more interaction.
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